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While economic models have already proven useful to analyze big picture questions about climate
policy such as the choice between a carbon tax or cap-and-trade permit system, the 19 chapters in
this book show how economic models also are useful to address the many remaining smaller questions
that arise as policy is implemented. For example, chapters consider: the tradeoffs policymakers confront
in deciding whether to implement the policy upstream on energy producers or downstream on energy
users; how to monitor and enforce climate policy; how Federal actions might interact with climate
policies at other levels of government or with other non-climate policies; the distributional effects
of different policy variations; policies that might impact particular sectors, including residential energy
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Climate change is one of the most challenging issues facing policymakers today. Greenhouse gas 
emissions create externalities across the globe, which means that climate change mitigation 
requires internationally coordinated policy intervention. At the same time, every sector of the 
economy creates greenhouse gas emissions, some in large quantities. Therefore, climate change 
action, whenever it occurs, will be an expansive undertaking for any government. 
The prospects for U.S. federal climate change legislation have waxed and waned over the past 
several years. In 2007, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee approved the 
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act. At the time, this was the farthest climate legislation 
had progressed in the U.S. Congress. In 2009, the full House of Representatives passed the 
Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy Solutions Act (HR2454). Since the eventual failure of 
that Act, Congress has not considered any new climate change legislation. 
We launched this book with the aim of engaging economic researchers to answer specific 
questions on climate-policy implementation. When we began the project in early 2009, we 
hoped our contributors would provide timely research on policy designs, but we proceeded with 
caution because the risk appeared real that the Federal government would enact comprehensive 
climate legislation before our authors could submit their first drafts. As we write this 
introduction and summary in 2011, the opposite concern appears more relevant, since legislation 
on climate change now seems unlikely for at least several years. Nevertheless, we believed in 
2009 and believe even more firmly today that economists have valuable expertise and insight to 
offer policymakers as they work through legislative and other approaches to mitigating climate 
change. Addressing climate change will be a massive undertaking, but we can draw on useful 
economic models as well as analogous experiences that economists have studied to help guide 
the policy process. 
 
Early economic research on climate change has already contributed to our understanding of the 
scope of the damages associated with global warming as well as the costs of broadly defined 
strategies to reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. For example, 
researchers described the costs of global warming to various sectors of the economy, the 
potential savings from market-based incentives, and the major tradeoffs policymakers confront 
when deciding whether to use a price instrument like emissions taxes or a quantity instrument 
like tradable permits. 
 
While economic models have proven useful to analyze these big picture issues, the next steps of 
the policy process require answers to a long list of more specific questions that bear on the actual 
design and implementation of U.S. climate policy. If a cap-and-trade program is chosen, how 
will permits be allocated initially?  Can permits be banked for use in a later period?  If so, under 
what rules?  Who will be allowed to sell offsets for the reduction of GHG emissions or the 
sequestration of CO2?  How will those offsets be verified?  What are the many distributional 
effects of these policies?  How can any adverse distributional effects be ameliorated?  What 





To get answers to these and other questions, we took a more prescriptive approach to developing 
this book than is conventional in economics. In particular, for most edited volumes in our field, 
editors select authors and give them some general guidance about the topic or topics they would 
like to see addressed. In contrast, we began by developing a detailed set of design and imple-
mentation questions that we thought needed answers. We next identified an academic economist 
whose expertise was relevant to each question. In almost all cases, we approached authors who 
had worked on related topics, but who would have to address topics that were new to them and 
new to the literature to write the chapter for our book. For example, Hilary Sigman has worked 
on enforcement and monitoring issues before, but not in the context of climate change. 
 
To help induce our authors to take on new research topics, we asked for chapters that were 
shorter than the usual research paper. We advised authors to think hard about their assigned 
question, start an economic model to analyze it, collect whatever initial data could be used in that 
model, and suggest initial answers. We hoped that starting to work on the topic for our book 
would lead these authors into further research on each topic, which we have been delighted to 
see transpire in several cases (Bushnell and Mansur, 2011; Sigman and Chang, 2011). 
 
The remainder of the introduction summarizes the chapters and relates them to each other.  The 
full table of contents for the book is available below as an Appendix.  We do not attempt to 
review all of the other important literature in this field. Both the book edited by Guesnerie and 
Tulkens (2008),The Design of Climate Policy, and the review article by Aldy et al. (2010) in the 
Journal of Economic Literature called “Designing Climate Mitigation Policy” provide more 
comprehensive reviews than is possible here. 
A.  CLIMATE POLICY IN THE BROADER CONTEXT 
The first six chapters consider the possible effects of U.S. climate policy on a range of economic 
outcomes, including household income, employment, innovation, greenhouse gas emissions 
outside the U.S., emissions of non-greenhouse gas pollutants, and the natural carbon cycle. All 
six authors use economic theory, developed through simple, intuitive models, to identify 
different pathways by which each effect might operate. Several of the authors also use simula-
tions or empirical estimates to bring data-driven evidence to bear on the questions they examine. 
 
The first chapter – arguably broadest in scope – quantifies the effects of climate policy on several 
different factors that impact household disposable income. Specifically, Gilbert Metcalf, Aparna 
Mathur and Kevin Hassett simulate the impact of a CO2 price of $15 per ton and analyze the 
burden absorbed by households at different deciles of the income distribution. By way of 
comparison, several of their scenarios also examine households at different points of the 
consumption distribution. Consumption is a more reliable indicator of lifetime income, as some 
households, such as students, have income that is temporarily very low. They disaggregate 
household income into capital and labor sources and model the impact of carbon pricing on both 
of these components. They also analyze changes in the prices of consumption bundles. 
  
Estimates like these are central to political debates about carbon pricing, which is often seen as 
regressive, given the rough logic that low-income consumers spend a higher share of their 
income on electricity, natural gas, and gasoline. As Metcalf, Mathur and Hassett point out, 
however, this rough logic is contradicted by the fact that higher income households are more -3- 
 
 
likely to be hurt by reductions in employment or lower returns to capital caused by a CO2 price. 
Their paper certainly suggests that we need to develop more thorough analyses of the extent to 
which carbon pricing is likely to be forward shifted (i.e., lead to higher consumer prices) or 
backwards shifted (i.e., reduce returns to capital and labor). Another possibility, which goes 
beyond the scope of the model in this chapter, is that the burden will be shifted abroad, for 
instance, to the Saudi government if climate policy causes oil prices to fall. While the authors use 
assumptions designed to cover a range of possibilities, it is important to continue to get concrete 
data that could inform which of their scenarios is most relevant. 
 
In this spirit, Chapter 2 by Olivier Deschênes takes an important step towards quantifying one of 
the backwards-shifting mechanisms identified by Metcalf, Mathur and Hassett – the effects of 
climate policy on labor markets. Conventional wisdom suggests that putting a price on carbon 
will reduce employment, but, as in the first chapter, Deschênes’ economic model points out that 
this simple logic does not capture the full story. He begins by writing down a basic economic 
relationship that elucidates how a change in energy prices, such as one induced by a positive 
price on CO2 emissions, might impact labor. Any cost-minimizing, profit-maximizing firm 
confronted with a price increase for one of their inputs faces two options, which are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. They can use less of the more expensive input and substitute to 
other inputs, or they can make less of the good. If manufacturers reduce their output, all else 
equal, employment will unambiguously fall. As Deschênes points out, this is commonly called 
the scale effect. But, for a given level of output, it is not clear whether energy and labor are 
complements in the production process or substitutes, in which case employment might rise. 
Ultimately, the answer is empirical, and it may vary by skill-level of the job, industry, or region 
of the country. 
  
To begin to get some insight into these questions, Deschênes estimates the empirical relationship 
between state-by-year variation in electricity prices and employment. He finds that a 4 percent 
increase in electricity prices, consistent with estimates of the impact of the Waxman-Markey 
legislation that passed the House in 2009, leads to approximately a 0.5% reduction in U.S. 
employment. Whether one interprets these effects as big or small depends on one’s perspective. 
A 0.5% reduction means a loss of several hundred thousand jobs, which is a large number, but, 
as Deschênes notes, the 2008 recession caused employment losses that were almost ten times 
larger. We hope that in future work, Deschênes and others will also separate the effects along 
different dimensions, such as industry sector, region of the country, or skill-level of the jobs 
(which would speak to the assumptions in the Metcalf, Mathur and Hassett chapter on 
distributional implications). This will help inform policy discussions, not just about who will be 
the winners and losers, but also about how policies might be designed to mitigate the harm to 
those bearing the largest burden. 
 
Chapter 3 addresses a related topic, as conventional wisdom often highlights the concern that 
jobs will be exported abroad if the U.S. unilaterally imposes a price on carbon. If jobs are 
exported abroad, emissions may go with them, which can undo the benefits of U.S.-based efforts 
to limit carbon emissions (this is called “leakage”). Kala Krishna begins by describing some of 
the specific findings from work that relies on computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, 
and she highlights findings on the effectiveness of border tax adjustments for leakage mitigation. -4- 
 
 
Noting that a CGE model can be a “black box,” she provides a clear description of the 
mechanisms at play in these models, focusing on how border tax adjustments are represented.  
 
Krishna goes on to point out how different conditions in product and factor markets will lead to 
different effects of policies. She makes an interesting point, for example, in the case where the 
U.S restricts emissions in a way that would normally cause leakage. If the rest of the world has a 
generous, perhaps even non-binding cap, then that emissions leakage will be mitigated, as it 
would cause the cap for the rest of the world to become binding. Any further pressure to increase 
emissions in the rest of the world will not result in more emissions, as it will only drive up the 
price of carbon abroad. 
 
In Chapter 4, Charles Kolstad takes on another important consideration for any climate change 
mitigation policy – how might it affect innovation designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions?  
Specifically, the consensus is that achieving the types of greenhouse gas reductions required to 
thwart dangerous climate change will involve fundamental changes to the way society produces 
and consumes energy. It is critical to understand, therefore, how polices that the U.S. is likely to 
enact in the next several years will affect investments in activities that could bring about these 
types of transformative changes. 
 
Kolstad’s model focuses on the incentives of the innovator. Specifically, he models a single 
innovating firm that licenses its technology to multiple identical atomistic polluting firms. He 
shows that a social planner can set either a tax or an emissions cap to achieve the first-best levels 
of both abatement and investment in innovations that reduce the marginal cost of abatement. He 
shows that under a permit system, the innovator captures the entire surplus through a license to 
the polluting firms. Under a tax system, however, the innovator shares the gains with the 
polluters in the form of lower abatement costs. The intuition for this result is that under the cap-
and-trade system the polluting firms are required to abate a certain amount, so their objective is 
to find the cheapest way to do it (strictly speaking, Kolstad is modeling a pure “cap” system, 
since his model has no trading between the identical firms). As long as the licensing fee plus the 
lower cost technology is epsilon cheaper than the pre-innovation abatement technology, the 
polluting firms will choose it. In the case of a tax, however, the cost of abatement factors into the 
polluting firms’ decisions about how much to abate, so the optimal licensing fee leaves some 
rents to the abating firm. 
 
Kolstad’s result suggests that cap-and-trade systems may provide stronger incentives for 
innovation. Going forward, it will be important to evaluate this result under different 
assumptions, for instance, to allow the innovating firm to use a multi-part price structure for the 
innovative technology or to otherwise enrich the depiction of the relationship between the 
innovating and polluting firms. 
 
In Chapter 5, Stephen Holland describes, both theoretically and empirically, spillovers from CO2 
emissions regulations to other pollutants. This is an important point, and one that has received 
attention from an environmental justice community that fears GHG mitigation policies could 
lead to increased criteria pollutant concentrations in disadvantaged areas. The academic 
literature, at least to date, has largely overlooked the topic. It is important to consider, since 
reducing GHG emissions may lead to significant increases or reductions in other pollutants. -5- 
 
 
Efficient climate policy design would consider spillovers, though the specific way to account for 
any costs or benefits depends critically on the nature (or lack) of regulatory treatment of the other 
pollutants. Spillovers may also factor into political and distributional considerations about 
climate policy. 
 
Since the U.S. currently does not have a comprehensive climate-change policy, obtaining 
empirical estimates of the extent of spillovers is not straightforward. Holland takes a clever 
approach to solving that problem and looks for evidence of spillovers to CO2 emissions from 
NOx regulations. Under relatively strong assumptions (i.e. unconstrained, profit-maximizing 
firms and only marginal changes in the prices of both CO2 emissions and NOx emissions), the 
response of CO2 emissions to a change in the price of NOx emissions is equal to the response of 
NOx emissions to a change in the price of CO2. Holland finds that CO2 and NOx emissions both 
fall when the price of NOx emissions increases, and this is primarily driven by the output effect, 
as higher NOx prices cause older plants to reduce operation. While Holland takes an electricity 
generating plant as his unit of analysis, it will be important to extend this type of analysis to 
more aggregate units of analysis, such as the western electricity grid. 
 
The final chapter in this section addresses spillovers from regulations of anthropogenic carbon 
emissions to the larger carbon cycle. Some of the basic facts Severin Borenstein lays out are 
quite sobering and provocative: annual anthropogenic carbon emissions are about nine gigatons, 
while the natural carbon flux emits and absorbs 210 gigatons of carbon per year!  Importantly, 
human activities can alter the natural carbon flux in many ways. So, if global governments 
succeed in enacting policies that reduce anthropogenic carbon emissions by half, which is a 
much larger reduction than contemplated by any near-term policies, all that work could be 
undone if the adjustments to achieve the reductions in anthropogenic emissions led to a mere two 
percent change in the natural carbon absorption. Borenstein goes on to discuss the implications 
of this fact for market-based climate policies. 
B.  INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER POLICIES 
The effect of a U.S. federal climate policy depends on climate-change mitigation strategies 
pursued by states or other national governments. Chapter 7 by Lawrence Goulder and Robert 
Stavins considers the problem of interactions between state and federal policies, focusing on cap-
and-trade programs or a carbon tax. Take as an example the effects of a sub-national cap-and-
trade system such as enacted already in ten northeastern states (the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, called RGGI). With no other climate policy anywhere, then RGGI might succeed in 
reducing emissions in those states. Other jurisdictions, however, might increase production, 
which could drive up their emissions (i.e., leading to leakage). As a result, the overall cost of 
emission reduction is not minimized because marginal abatement costs are not equalized. 
 
Suppose instead that the Federal government has a carbon tax (or a permit system with a binding 
safety valve). Then the sub-national policy has very similar effects to those just described: any 
binding sub-national restriction may result in some leakage if other states increase production at 
their unchanged emissions price. On the other hand, consider a stringent sub-national policy in 
the context of a Federal permit system with a lower price (not at any safety valve ceiling price). 
In that case, Goulder and Stavins show that leakage will be complete -- with no net emissions 
reductions whatever. The reason is that firms in that sub-national regime must reduce emissions -6- 
 
 
by some quantity, which makes exactly that quantity of national permits available to any firms 
outside that sub-national regime. It effectively increases the supply of permits to others, and so 
reduces the nationwide price of Federal permits.   
 
Interestingly, it also implies a difference between a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade program, 
even with perfect certainty. With a U.S. carbon tax, RGGI could reduce emissions further. With 
a Federal cap-and-trade system, however, RGGI would have no effect on the environment, but 
would only reduce overall cost-effectiveness by introducing a difference between permit prices 
and therefore marginal costs of abatement. Goulder and Stavins consider other interesting cases 
and a variety of complications, some of which change the simple result we have described.  
 
While Goulder and Stavins look at climate policy interactions between different jurisdictions, 
Chapter 8 by Arik Levinson looks at interactions between different policies. To reduce carbon 
emissions, a single jurisdiction may choose to enact both a market policy (such as carbon tax or 
cap-and trade) and traditional standards (such as a low-carbon fuel standard or an energy-
efficiency requirement). Levinson points out that having both kinds of policies can lead to one of 
three outcomes:  the policies may be mutually reinforcing (like “belts and suspenders”), the 
binding policy may render the non-binding policy irrelevant, or, if both policies are binding, then 
they may raise costs relative to one efficient policy designed to achieve the same abatement. 
 
The cost-raising outcome occurs, for example, if a binding standard such as a low-carbon fuel 
standard means that more abatement takes place by that expensive means rather than by some 
other means – at the lower marginal abatement cost given by the common permit price 
elsewhere. In contrast, the irrelevant outcome occurs if the standard is not binding. Even if the 
standard alone would bind, a stringent carbon pricing policy may induce firms to reduce the 
carbon content of fuel below the standard’s requirement. Finally, the “mutually reinforcing” 
outcome may occur either because of some other market failure, or because of administrative 
complexity. For an example of the former, consider that if landlords’ energy-efficiency 
investments cannot be observed adequately, then renters may not be willing to pay for them. 
(Lucas Davis’ chapter, described below, considers this possibility directly.)  A carbon pricing 
mechanism alone might then raise the cost of heating fuel paid by renters but still not be enough 
to induce landlords to pay for low-cost abatement via energy-efficiency investments. It may 
require additional regulations such as building codes. For an example of administrative 
complexity, consider the difficulty of applying carbon pricing to all forms of carbon, especially 
ad hoc fuels used in developing countries. A simple ban on the most carbon-intensive fuels may 
be more enforceable than collecting a price on the carbon content of it.  
 
In addition to interacting with each other, both mandatory carbon pricing and more traditional 
regulations may interact with purely voluntary programs. In Chapter 9, Matthew Kotchen 
considers a particular voluntary program. Specifically, in 2005, the State of Connecticut started a 
“Clean Energy Options” program that allows individual households to pay extra for “green” 
electricity (produced by a mix of wind and small-scale hydro sources). In return, any 
municipality that enrolls at least a threshold share of the local households can qualify for the 
“Connecticut Clean Energy Communities” (CCEC) program that provides free solar panels to 
display prominently in public locations. Kotchen regards the free solar panels as a “nudge”, as 
they provide a low-cost mechanism to encourage voluntary household participation yet are not a -7- 
 
 
true quid pro quo of any substantial value. He finds that the merely symbolic CCEC reward 
induced a 39 percent increase in household participation in the “Options” program to pay for 
green electricity. That increase represents 7,000 households, 31 percent of all participating 
households statewide, and prevents an estimated 23,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions. 
 
Kotchen thus demonstrates that a voluntary program can have significant impact. An interesting 
follow-on question is how that voluntary program might interact with other mandatory programs. 
If the state or federal government introduced a mandatory carbon abatement policy or carbon 
pricing policy, would households see their extra mandated costs as reasons not to incur any other 
costs voluntarily?  In the language of other chapters just described, a binding cap-and-trade 
policy might make a non-binding voluntary program irrelevant. If so, it reduces the net 
abatement achieved by the cap-and-trade program by the loss of abatement that otherwise would 
have been achieved with just the voluntary program.  
 
These studies explain just a few of the examples of climate policy interactions. More generally, 
climate policy can interact with any tax or regulation at the federal, state, or local level. Clearly a 
federal climate policy interacts with state or regional climate policy, but it also might interact 
with federal or state tax policy or even non-environmental regulations. For example, a federal tax 
or price on carbon may compound the effects of a federal or state tax on energy, such as the 
gasoline excise tax. Therefore a careful analyst must simultaneously consider the relevant taxes 
or regulations at all levels.  
 
A climate policy may also interact with international policies, such as those intended to address 
the competitiveness of U.S. industry in trade with other countries. If U.S. producers face a price 
on each ton of carbon dioxide emissions, the cost of producing U.S. goods would rise, so climate 
policy might best be paired with other policies that restore U.S. competitiveness in some manner. 
One of the proposed methods to address U.S. competitiveness is to give some CO2 permits to 
firms in proportion to their output. Chapter 10 by Meredith Fowlie studies this kind of “output-
based permit allocation” (OBPA).  
 
As she notes, a standard carbon tax or price minimizes the total abatement cost, because it works 
via two effects. First, the “substitution effect” induces firms to shift from carbon-intensive inputs 
toward other inputs, which reduces the carbon per unit of output. Second, the “output effect” 
raises the cost of production and thus reduces the number of units of output demanded. In an 
open economy, however, the latter effect may harm U.S. competitiveness, move production 
overseas, and cause leakage. 
 
Some U.S. proposals would combat this competitiveness problem with an OBPA, which 
essentially rewards firms for producing more output. Fowlie points out that this implicit output 
subsidy has both pros and cons. The advantage is that it can offset some of the climate policy’s 
effect on U.S. output prices, which helps U.S. firms compete and reduces leakage.  The 
disadvantage is that it raises the overall cost of carbon abatement, by moving away from the 
cost-minimizing combination of abatement methods. A cap-and-trade program with OBPA still 
induces firms to shift towards less carbon-intensive production (the substitution effect), but it no 
longer induces consumers to reduce purchases (the output effect). With a fixed total number of 
permits and therefore a fixed requirement for total abatement, any attempt to protect one industry -8- 
 
 
by OBPA means that more of the abatement must be undertaken by other industries. Those other 
industries presumably will need to undertake more expensive abatement strategies, as they move 
up their rising marginal cost of abatement schedule.  
 
Moreover, the House Bill (HR2454) specified that eligibility for this output subsidy would be 
based on some combination of the industry’s energy intensity and trade intensity (that is, import 
penetration, or trade vulnerability). Industries with energy or emissions intensities above 20% are 
eligible regardless of trade intensity. But Fowlie shows that these are exactly the industries for 
which OBPA is most costly. Giving this output subsidy to energy-intensive industries means not 
reducing the output of energy-intensive industries. Instead, emissions must be reduced in 
industries that are not emission intensive, which can be very costly.   
C.  DESIGN FEATURES OF CLIMATE POLICY 
Many economists like to characterize a carbon tax in simple models as a rate, t, on all carbon 
emissions, implicitly assuming perfect administration, measurement, and enforcement. This 
section describes issues in the detailed design of a climate policy, which includes decisions about 
how to administer it, how to monitor actual emissions, and how to enforce rules. An eventual 
policy will apply to particular firms and not others, and it may include various exemptions, 
varied rates, and offsets.  
 
One issue in the design of climate policy is whether to apply it “upstream” on the producers of 
fossil fuel (mines, oil wells, and importers) or “downstream” on the users of fossil fuel (drivers, 
electricity generators, and manufacturing plants with smokestacks). Chapter 11 by Erin Mansur 
points out that most pollutants are best regulated downstream, because the actual emitters may 
have means of reducing the emissions per unit of fuel. If those abatement methods are omitted, 
then overall cost of abatement is not minimized. In the case of carbon dioxide emissions, 
however, some have argued that those “end of pipe” methods are negligible or too expensive 
(such as carbon capture and sequestration, CCS). The actual emissions may be based entirely on 
the carbon content of the fuel.  Moreover, the tax or permit price could be collected from 150 
refineries in the U.S. instead of from 105,000 gasoline service stations – or even worse, from 
drivers of 244 million motor vehicles. Measurement devices on all such vehicles would be 
prohibitively expensive.  
 
Mansur develops a theory of cost-minimizing decisions about where to apply the tax on the 
vertical chain of production (“vertical targeting”). He models the tradeoffs explicitly, with 
choices both about fuel inputs and end-of-pipe abatement technology. He then adds transactions 
costs that depend on the number of firms under the policy, and shows how the additional costs of 
administering more downstream firms might offset any cost advantages from capturing end-of-
pipe abatement technology downstream. He discusses how the choice might also be affected by 
leakage, which might be minimized by aiming at whatever part of the vertical chain has the least 
elastic foreign supply. He also notes problems with “offsets”, which are essentially payments for 
end-of-pipe or post-emission sequestration. Finally, he discusses how the analysis is changed by 
consideration of imperfect competition, price regulation by Public Utility Commissions that may 
or may not allow cost pass-through, and tax “salience” (where a more explicit payment of tax 




Chapter 12 by James Bushnell focuses on “offsets.”  He begins by pointing out than an ideal 
carbon tax or cap would apply to all emissions. For a variety of reasons, however, actual climate 
policy is virtually bound to exclude certain firms, industries or countries from the taxed or 
capped sector. First, monitoring and enforcement may be particularly difficult for some other 
greenhouse gases, or for small businesses, residences, and agriculture. Second, political pressures 
from certain sectors seeking an advantage may expand the definition of “small business” and 
other exemptions. Third, some jurisdictions might not participate in the carbon policy agreement. 
Fourth, the lowest cost mitigation might include activities that take carbon out of the atmosphere 
in the form of “sequestration.”  In those cases, economic efficiency suggests that the policy not 
only place a positive price on emissions, but also provide a subsidy to sequestration activities 
that are outside the capping jurisdiction or capped sectors. 
 
One way to achieve very low cost mitigation is to pay for sequestration though offsets, but the 
chapter by Bushnell points out a number of problems with those programs. First of all, any 
payments from firms in the capped jurisdiction to those in the uncapped jurisdiction inherently 
test the limits of inter-jurisdictional regulatory cooperation. Officials in the “host” nations must 
provide verification data or at least allow access to such data. Second, those host nations are 
often developing countries with weak regulatory or governance structures. Third, the system 
must set an “emissions baseline” against which to measure reductions. This step is literally 
impossible to do accurately, as it requires knowing the counterfactual emissions in the absence of 
the program. Firms may have better information than regulators about steps they would have 
taken in the absence of the program, which gives rise to problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection.  
 
If authorities correctly gauge each firm’s true baseline (emissions without any offset policy), 
then no such problems arise. With imperfect information, the moral hazard problem suggests that 
firms will have the incentive to invest in high-carbon projects or to delay investments in 
abatement, so that regulators set a high baseline. That way, they can receive offset payments for 
undertaking more abatement than they would have pursued absent the program. The adverse 
selection problem arises not from changes in firm behavior, but because authorities do not know 
which firms have high or low actual baselines. The effects of offsets will then depend on whether 
the authorities are right on average about firms’ baselines.  If so, only firms with low actual 
baselines will opt into the offset program. Those with high actual baselines opt out and undertake 
no abatement. The result is more emissions and less overall abatement than anticipated. If 
authorities are wrong on average, then all baselines may be over-estimated, and payments may 
be high. In this case the offset program does not inefficiently allocate abatement, but it may 
result in less total abatement than anticipated – and thus may require tighter controls in the 
capped sector.  
 
This study has implications for actual carbon policy design and implementation, particularly 
suggestions that the problems with offsets be addressed by placing a ceiling on the total number 
of offsets or a devaluation of all offsets. The former does nothing to fix the problem of adverse 
selection when only some firms opt into the program, and the latter may inappropriately treat all 
offsets as equally non-additional. More efficient responses might include overall program 




Hilary Sigman provides a formal treatment of monitoring and enforcement issues in Chapter 13. 
She assumes that the firm’s compliance level depends on the cost of reducing emissions, the 
price of a carbon dioxide permit, the probability of detection for noncompliance, and the fine for 
noncompliance. She points out that both the fine and the probability of detection are low in 
existing permit programs in Europe and the U.S., while observed compliance is high. This 
combination is somewhat puzzling, given the predictions of the model, but perhaps firms are 
concerned with public perceptions – the firm’s image with customers, host communities, and 
potential employees.  She also looks at the trend over time in the price of actual carbon dioxide 
permits in Europe, as opposed to the price of credits for reducing emissions elsewhere (offsets). 
Since the EU-ETS allows one-for-one trades between permits and offsets, we might expect these 
prices to be similar. Yet the difference in price is sometimes large, indicating that the offsets are 
not worth as much as permits to European firms. Again those firms may be concerned about the 
public relations problem of avoiding actual abatement in Europe, or they perceive a greater risk 
that offsets will be declared noncompliant.  
 
With heterogeneous monitoring and enforcement costs among firms or emissions sources, 
Sigman notes that policymakers have a choice about how many to include within the emission 
cap. Regulators might want to exclude emission sources with very high monitoring and 
enforcement costs, where a firm might find cheating easier, but Sigman shows that extending the 
program to include more sources can bring down the price of a permit enough to discourage 
noncompliance generally. Thus policymakers might find more compliance with a broader 
program that includes more sources – even those that are more difficult to monitor. 
 
In both the economic research and the policy spheres, most discussions have focused on 
mitigation – addressing climate change by restricting GHG emissions. Chapter 14 by Kerry 
Smith, by contrast, models adaptation to the warmer temperatures, reduced rainfall, and other 
changes associated with higher GHG concentrations. This can be a policy issue, as governments 
face the choice of either doing nothing (essentially waiting to see the degree of climate change 
before responding), or taking steps now to anticipate climate change and to facilitate adaptation.  
 
Some goods represent “substitutes” for climate. If the climate gets hotter, we could substitute 
into more electricity for air conditioning. If climate change means reduced rainfall in some areas, 
one substitute good is increased storage of water in reservoirs. Many margins of substitution are 
possible, as residents could also substitute into goods that require less water!  In any case, 
Smith’s chapter points out that economic incentives can facilitate adaptation. If electricity or 
water is capacity constrained, for example, then policymakers can help allocate those scarce 
resources with pricing policies that take into account the scarcity at any particular time and place 
– perhaps using new metering technologies. Old technologies allow only one price per unit of 
water or electricity, so past analyses find the best single price and best single capacity that 
maximize expected social surplus given uncertain supply and demand. New technologies allow 
real-time pricing, however, which allows better allocation of the resource given any total 
availability within one period.  Economic welfare then can exceed the level under current rules, 
where a drought leads to arbitrary decisions about water allocation (e.g. rules against certain uses 




In other words, efficient policy planning for adaptation should not focus only on building the 
right number or type of power plants, dams, and other infrastructure. The need for that 
infrastructure depends on how goods like water and electricity will be priced.   The bottom line is 
that policymakers must make decisions about built capacity, pricing policies, and access to 
resources during times of shortage; these decisions are related to each other, and they all affect 
economic welfare.  
 
A final design decision considered in this section is the question of whether or not to phase-in the 
provisions of climate policy, either by raising the carbon tax rate gradually over time or by 
reducing the number of permits over time. To address this question, Chapter 15 by Roberton 
Williams builds a simple analytical, dynamic model with one sector that uses two inputs: 
emissions and one type of capital. Investment in new capital entails adjustment costs, providing a 
reason not to switch too rapidly away from emissions and into new capital. He then considers 
several different cases: a flow pollutant or stock pollutant, where marginal damages are either 
constant or rising with pollution.  
 
For climate change, the relevant case is that of a stock pollutant, because damages depend on the 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which depends on accumulated emissions. 
If damages are proportional to that stock, so that marginal damages are constant, then Williams 
shows that the optimal price of emissions is constant – no phase-in of a carbon tax. In this same 
case, however, the optimal emissions each year are falling. Thus the optimal permit policy is 
phased in, with a falling number of permits issued each year.  
 
If marginal pollution damages increase with the stock of GHG, however, then an optimal policy 
that reduces the stock of pollution over time will result in marginal damages that also fall over 
time, and therefore a price of emissions that falls over time. Then the optimal price path for 
emissions is one that jumps immediately to a level above its long run level. The optimal carbon 
tax then falls gradually, which is the opposite of the usual phase-in with a rising carbon tax. 
 
Finally, Williams analyzes other considerations that may alter this optimal phase-in rule. If 
policymakers are concerned about the distribution of burdens, for example, then they may phase 
in a gradually increasing tax rate to limit the cost imposed on current owners of polluting capital. 
If authorities must take time to build capacity for monitoring or enforcement, then they may need 
to start with a subset of polluters and gradually expand the program to more firms. In any case, 
having dug into the topic, Williams concludes that these issues deserve more study.  
D.  SECTOR-SPECIFIC ISSUES 
The remaining chapters consider climate policy issues that are specific to four important areas: 
urban policy, plus the agricultural, automotive and buildings sectors. 
 
Much of Matthew Kahn’s recent work, summarized in Kahn (2010), considers the interaction 
between cities and climate change.  As temperatures rise, for example, which cities are likely to 
gain population and which will lose population?  Will higher temperatures lead people to move 
from rural and suburban neighborhoods into city centers?  If the answer to the second question is 
“yes”, urban economic theory predicts that center-city residents will use less energy and 
therefore emit fewer greenhouse gases. This is because land prices are higher in cities, so -12- 
 
 
residents will live in smaller spaces, own fewer cars (which require land to store) and use the 
ones they do own to drive fewer miles (as urban density makes alternatives like walking or 
public transportation better substitutes).  
 
In Chapter 16, Kahn sets out to evaluate this theory empirically. He uses three distinct data sets 
to evaluate whether center-city residents (a) drive fewer miles, (b) use public transportation 
more, and (c) use less electricity in their homes. He finds empirical support for the predictions of 
urban economic theory in all three cases, and the magnitude of the effects he measures is quite 
large. For instance, he finds that households living in census block groups at the 25
th percentile 
of population density drive 25 percent more than households at in the 75
th percentile (and this 
distribution is taken over households that already live within 35 miles of a major city center). It 
is interesting to consider Kahn’s estimates relative to the gasoline price elasticities estimated by 
Knittel and Sandler (in Chapter 19, discussed below). This comparison suggests that the same 
change in driving would require gas prices to approximately double. Kahn’s work forces us to 
consider the fact that urban policies, such as redevelopment or crime prevention programs, also 
may impact greenhouse gas emissions. As Chris Knittel’s comments make clear, this chapter by 
Kahn is a first step, but has not fully addressed the possibility that the observed relationships 
reflect selection. For instance, if households that currently live in the suburbs were forced to 
relocate to the city center, they might make different choices than households currently choosing 
to live in dense, urban areas. 
 
Chapter 17 by Michael Roberts and Wolfram Schlenker focuses on the agricultural sector, which 
is a small share of the U.S. economy (less than 2% of GDP), but which creates large consumer 
surplus both in the U.S. and abroad. They focus on corn and soybean yields, noting that together 
with wheat and rice, these crops account for about 75 percent of world caloric consumption. 
Their estimates, which are consistent with previous work, suggest that U.S. crop yields fall 
dramatically in response to extreme temperatures. Specifically, annual yields decrease once 
average temperatures over any day exceed approximately 30°C, and the effects are predicted to 
be quite large (yields decrease by five percent for every 24-hour period that the temperature 
averages 40°C). A natural question to ask is whether technological progress is likely to make 
crops more resilient to heat in the future. Roberts and Schlenker look to the past as a guide, first 
noting the tremendous progress over the last seventy to eighty years in efforts to increase yields, 
particularly for corn. This progress has largely been attributed to advances in new seed 
engineering and fertilizer use. As they document, however, increased yields have if anything 
come at the expense of heat resistance, as decade-by-decade estimates suggest that yields may be 
declining more during periods of extreme heat than they did at the beginning of the sample 
period. They conclude by discussing the extent to which private companies will have an 
incentive to invest in research and development on heat-resistant seeds, as well as any possible 
role for policy.  
 
Chapter 18 by Christopher Knittel and Ryan Sandler considers the automotive sector. Noting that 
environmental policies to price carbon emissions are likely to lead to higher gas prices, they 
examine how consumers have responded to recent changes in gas prices to provide insight into 
how they would respond to carbon pricing. As the authors point out, consumers can adjust their 
behavior along a number of margins when faced by higher gasoline prices – driving less, buying 
more fuel-efficient new or used vehicles, scrapping fuel-inefficient vehicles, servicing their -13- 
 
 
vehicle more frequently, or not driving too fast on the highway. While much of the previous 
literature has focused on the car purchase decision, they use a novel data source to consider both 
retirements (scrapping) and vehicle miles traveled. Specifically, they use information from 
California smog tests, which monitor every car older than six years at least once every two years.  
 
They find large effects for scrapping decisions – vehicles in general are scrapped less when gas 
prices are high. This may reflect an income effect, whereby households that are paying more for 
gasoline are less likely to invest in a new vehicle and so keep their old one around longer. The 
more fuel inefficient cars, however, are more likely to be scrapped. Their results are provocative, 
yet the importance of the control variables suggests more room for further research. Also, while 
rich, the authors’ data do not perfectly measure scrapping, so they must assume that vehicles that 
disappear from the data are scrapped. As mentioned above, they also find a large effect on 
vehicle-miles travelled. 
 
The final chapter, by Lucas Davis, considers the buildings sector, which accounts for 40 percent 
of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. and has been singled out as a likely source of 
opportunities to reduce emissions at very low or even negative costs (McKinsey, 2007). The 
remaining question to economists is why the people who live and work in buildings have not 
taken advantage of these opportunities already, particularly if they would reduce energy bills by 
more than they would cost. Davis considers one of the potential explanations for the so-called 
“energy-efficiency gap.” Specifically, he evaluates whether renters are less likely to have energy-
efficient appliances than homeowners. This pattern is consistent with a principal-agent problem 
whereby landlords purchase the inefficient appliances because tenants pay the bills, and tenants 
cannot observe or do not consider the energy efficiency of the appliances when deciding whether 
to live in a particular home. Using cross-sectional survey data, Davis finds this to be the case, 
and his results stand-up to a very careful consideration of alternative explanations and functional 
forms. In terms of magnitudes, his results suggest that renters are between one and ten 
percentage points less likely to have energy-efficient appliances, which, relative to baseline 
penetration rates below fifty percent in all cases, accounts for a reasonable share of the variation 
between renters and homeowners. 
 
Each chapter of this book makes an initial contribution to the economic analysis of an issue 
related to the design of U.S. climate change policy. Many of the detailed issues that our authors 
analyze must be resolved before climate policy can be implemented, so the compilation of initial 
efforts amounts to a major step forward. We expect that the studies in this book will draw 
attention to new research areas of vital importance to any efforts to reduce future climate change. 
The work will also contribute to better policy regarding whether and how to mitigate damages 
from global warming, sea level rise, loss of coastal areas, increased storm severity, loss of 
biodiversity, and increased frequency and duration of droughts.  We look forward to reading 
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